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•     Local governments in Illinois rely heavily on prop-
erty taxes as a source of revenue—in 2010, local
governments collected approximately $23.4 bil-
lion in property taxes. Illinois has the fourth high-
est property tax burden in the United States.
•     The property tax base in Illinois is determined
using a four-step process based on the prop-
erty’s fair cash value. The sum of the tax bases
of all individual properties within a taxing dis-
trict creates the total tax base. The tax share is
the ratio of a property’s taxable equalized
assessed value to the total tax base in the tax-
payer’s jurisdiction.
•     A large portion of annual changes in individual
property tax liabilities are due to changes in tax
shares rather than changes in tax extensions, or
revenue.
•    The authors present a new property tax state-
ment that conveys the changes in tax liability by
including information on the jurisdictions’ rev-
enue and tax bases and the taxpayer’s tax shares.
This chapter takes a look at local governments’ biggest source of revenue: property taxes. The
authors provide a primer on how the taxes are calculated, and new formulas for understanding an
individual’s tax share. The authors also propose an alternative format for local property tax
statements that can be used to better communicate answers to taxpayers who wonder why their
property tax liability has changed.
Local governments in Illinois collect more inproperty taxes than the state government col-
lects from any of its major taxes. In 2010, local gov-
ernments collected approximately $23.4 billion in
property taxes, $8 billion more than the state gov-
ernment collected from its individual income tax
and general sales tax combined.1 When comparing
the tax burdens of Illinois taxpayers to taxpayers
in other states, Illinois ranks fourth highest in
property tax burden and 22nd highest in both indi-
vidual income tax burden and general sales tax
burden.2
The debate over property taxes in Illinois seems to
be an endless recycling of reforms. The one thing
that is clear is that property taxes are confusing. We
believe this is so primarily because people expect
their property taxes to behave like other major
taxes. Yet the institutions of property taxation are
not at all like the institutions of income and sales
taxation, and we should expect the property tax to
behave differently. In this chapter, we invite you to
rethink the Illinois property tax and appreciate its
unique institutions. 
Rethinking Property Taxation
By Nathan B. Anderson and Rob Ross  
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1 U.S. Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finances,
Table 1, 2010.
2 This comparison is based on 2007 data. We use 2007 be-
cause the US Census of Governments is the only nation-
wide survey of state and local government finances, and
the most recent data are from 2007. Tax burdens are meas-
ured as a percentage of state per capita personal income.
Per capita personal income data are from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Rank includes the District of Columbia.
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We believe this rethinking is important because a
failure to understand property taxes may cause vot-
ers and policymakers to propose and support prop-
erty tax policies and reforms that are not in their best
interest, or in the best interest of their community or
the state of Illinois. We believe that full information
is essential to understanding the consequences of tax
policies and tax reforms and that this information is
often lacking in debates about property taxes.
We begin by reviewing some basic
facts about the level of property taxa-
tion in Illinois and then move on to
discuss Illinois’ property tax institu-
tions. Although the institutions of
property taxation are different from
other major taxes, the property tax in-
stitutions in Illinois are similar to those
of most other states. 
The most unique feature of property
taxation is that, instead of selecting
property tax rates, local governments in Illinois and
other states have the ability to select property tax
revenue. This ability to select revenue, rather than
rates, has important implications. Chief among
these is that the property tax is best thought of as a
local cost-sharing system that determines how the
members of a local community share the total cost
of providing the community’s public services. 
Next, we argue that thinking about the property tax
as a cost-sharing system helps explain why a person’s
property tax liability changes from one year to the
next as well as how tax relief programs affect tax lia-
bilities. Most importantly, we explain why increases
in your property tax liability are unreliable signals of
increases in government revenue. These unreliable
signals make it difficult for taxpayers to monitor the
relative fiscal restraint of their local governments. 
In the final section of the chapter, we propose a mod-
est innovation to property tax statements. Twice a
year, counties mail property tax statements to prop-
erty owners. We propose to reshape these statements
so they can provide additional information to ex-
plain changes in individuals’ tax liability. We argue
that incorporating new information will make it eas-
ier for taxpayers to understand why their property
tax liability changes from one year to the next,
thereby reducing the cost to taxpayers of monitoring
their local governments’ fiscal policies. In addition,
we argue that our modified property tax statement
makes it easier for taxpayers to predict future
changes in their tax liabilities, anticipate the conse-
quences of tax reform proposals, and evaluate the
cost of proposed increases in government spending. 
Basic Facts About Illinois Property Taxes
Property taxes are relatively high in
Illinois because our local governments
rely more heavily on property taxes
than local governments in many other
states. Local governments rely on two
broad revenue sources: money they
raise themselves and money they re-
ceive via transfers from other govern-
ments. In 2010, local governments in
Illinois had $70.1 billion in total rev-
enue, $39.9 billion of which they raised
themselves, $17.2 billion from the state government,
and $3.3 billion from the federal government. Prop-
erty taxes represented 59 percent of revenue raised
locally. The share of locally raised revenue derived
from the property tax is higher in Illinois than all
other neighboring states except Wisconsin.3
Many people associate property taxes primarily
with the funding of K-12 public education. In
2010, school districts in Illinois collected more
than half of all property taxes, while municipali-
ties collected about 17 percent and all other ju-
risdictions combined collected the remaining 25
“The debate over
property taxes in
Illinois seems to be an
endless  recycling of
reforms. The one
thing that is clear is
that property taxes
are confusing.”
Amount local governments in Illinois
collected in property taxes in 2010, $8
billion more than the state government
collected from its individual income tax
and general sales tax combined.
3 U.S. Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finances,
Table 1, 2010.
$23.4
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percent.4 In the United States overall, property tax
revenue accounts for 35 percent of school districts’
general revenue. In Illinois, that figure is 52 per-
cent. Illinois ranks fourth highest among the states
in terms of the share of school district revenue
raised by the local property tax.5
Within Illinois, however, there are large differences
between school districts in the extent of property tax
reliance. In Cook County, local taxes—the vast major-
ity of which are property taxes—account for 60 per-
cent of all public school revenue. In the northeast of
the state, excluding Cook County, local taxes account
for nearly 80 percent of all public school revenue, but
in the southeast, they account for 36 percent.6 The
across-district differences in the relative importance
of the property tax are driven by across-district dif-
ferences in the amount of state and federal aid.  
The Institutional Structure of the Illinois Property Tax 
All property tax systems are defined by a state’s
choice of the definition of the tax base and the re-
strictions it imposes, if any, on the freedom of local
governments to access that tax base. Illinois defines
the tax base of an individual property using a four-
step process. In the first step, the assessor determines
the property’s fair cash value, usually by estimating
the price that the property would sell for in an arms-
length transaction as of January 1 of that year. Next
in Step 2, the assessor multiplies the fair cash value
by a number called an assessment ratio. In Step 3,
the assessor multiplies the number from Step 2 by
another number (that may exceed one) called an
equalization factor. The value produced after Step 3
is called equalized assessed value (EAV). In Step 4,
the assessor subtracts certain amounts—called
exemptions—from the EAV to produce “taxable”
EAV. The equation for taxable EAV is below.
taxable EAV = (estimated market value) ×
(assessment ratio) × (equalization factor) – (total exemptions) 
Thus, the tax base of an individual property is de-
termined via estimation (Step 1), multiplication
(Steps 2 and 3), and subtraction (Step 4).
As a consequence of defining tax base in terms of
market value, the state must determine how often
it requires local assessors to update their market
value estimates to account for actual changes. In
counties other than Cook, local assessors must up-
date market value estimates at least every four
years.7 In Cook County, estimates must be updated
at least every three years.8
The sum of the tax bases of all individual properties
within a taxing district—county, municipality, school
district, special district, and/or township—creates
the district’s total tax base. In all counties, assessors
update the total tax base each year to incorporate the
estimated value of new and improved property. 
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Math Legend
 ≡ is identical to 
 Δ the change from one year ago in 
 ≈ is approximately equal to 
 % Δ the percentage change from one year ago in
4 The Illinois Department of Revenue. 
5 U.S. Census Bureau, Local Government Finances by Type of Government and State, Table 2, 2006-07.
6 Illinois I-Learn: http://webprod1.isbe.net/ilearn/ASP/LstARCDData.asp
7 The four-year standard applies to counties with fewer than 3 million inhabitants. 35 ILCS 200 §9-215.
8 The three-year standard applies to counties with more than 3 million inhabitants. 35 ILCS 200 §9-220. Local assessors have the authority
to update estimates of fair market value every year. 35 ILCS 200 §9-205.
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If the taxing district has unfettered access to its total
tax base, it is able to choose the amount of revenue
it wants to raise.9 This amount is referred to as the
levy and it is reported to the county clerk. Next, the
clerk is required to determine which tax rate, when
multiplied by the total tax base, produces the
amount of levy requested by the taxing district.10 If
the state has imposed restrictions on the district’s
access to the tax base, the clerk does not allow the
district to set a levy higher than the maximum al-
lowed under the restrictions. The amount of rev-
enue allowed by the clerk is referred to as the tax
extension. Thus, a taxing district’s tax rate is defined
by the following accounting identity.
____________tax rate ≡ tax extensiontotal tax base
In Illinois, the most important restrictions on access
to tax base are tax rate ceilings and a ceiling on the
annual increase in tax extensions—revenue—called
the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL).
These rate ceilings vary across and within types of
taxing districts. PTELL restricts the percentage in-
crease in a taxing district’s extension to the lessor of
5 percent or the rate of inflation. Taxing districts can
exceed the PTELL ceilings and many tax rate ceilings
through referenda and various non-referenda ex-
emptions.
Further details on tax rate ceilings and PTELL are
beyond the scope of this chapter, but note that these
restrictions do not apply uniformly across the state
or across types of taxing districts. For example, tax
rate ceilings apply in all counties while PTELL ap-
plies only to non-home-rule taxing districts in 39
counties. In addition, tax rate ceilings are more
likely to bind revenue choices in districts with low
levels of total tax base, while PTELL is likely to
bind districts regardless of the level of their total
tax base.
Understanding Individual Tax Liabilities 
In this section, we introduce a new concept—tax
share—that is helpful in explaining individuals’ tax
liabilities. We believe that understanding the con-
cept of tax share helps make the property tax sys-
tem more transparent, and it
is essential to our proposed
new property tax statement.  
Although the county issues a
single property tax statement,
a property owner owes taxes
to multiple taxing districts.
Most will owe taxes to their
municipality, school district,
county, and at least several
special districts, such as a
park district, library district,
or water reclamation district. Because each district
may have a different extension and total tax base,
each taxing district has its own tax rate.  
For simplicity, it is best to consider the taxes that a
property owner owes to one of its taxing districts.
Generally, an owner’s property tax liability to one
taxing district is equal to the product of the dis-
trict’s tax rate and the property’s taxable EAV. 
Tax Liability ≡ tax rate × taxable EAV
If we replace “tax rate” by its definition from above
we get 
_____________Tax Liability ≡ (tax extension) × taxable EAV
(total tax base)
If we allow “taxable EAV” and “tax extension” to
switch places, we arrive at a different accounting
identity for tax liability.  
_____________Tax Liability ≡ taxable EAV  × (tax extension)
(total tax base)
A taxpayer’s tax share is the ratio of his or her
taxable EAV to the total tax base in this taxing
jurisdiction.   
“In the United States
overall, property tax
revenue accounts for
35 percent of school
districts’ general
revenue. In Illinois,
that figure is 52
percent.”
9 See the following statutes: 35 ILCS 200 §18-10 (counties)
and §18-15 (municipalities and school districts). 
10 See the following statute: 35 ILCS 200 §18-45. 
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_____________tax share ≡ taxable EAV  
total tax base
Because these are accounting identities, we know
that the two equations for tax liability are equiva-
lent. That is, the equations always produce identi-
cal tax liabilities; both are true. 
Tax Liability ≡ tax rate × taxable EAV ≡ tax share × tax extension  
Importantly, this equation shows that the tax share
equals the cost to an individual taxpayer for each
additional dollar of property tax revenue. In other
words, your tax share is the amount by which your
tax liability would increase if your taxing district
increased its extension by one dollar. Because this
will be a very small number, when interpreting the
tax share in this way it is informative to multiply it
by $1 million so that the tax share is the amount
your taxes would increase if your taxing district in-
creased its extension by $1 million. 
Although this new equation for tax liability is only
a rearranged version of the standard equation, it al-
lows us to decompose the annual change in an in-
dividual’s tax liability into two parts: the part
explained by tax share changes and the part ex-
plained by tax extension changes. These two parts
are mutually exclusive and can be readily calcu-
lated from administrative data.11∆ Tax Liability =
tax share effect + tax extension effect
The tax share effect isolates the part of the total an-
nual change in an individual’s tax liability that is
caused solely by changes in the tax share and not
by changes in tax extensions. It is the answer to the
question: if my taxing district had left its tax
extension unchanged, my tax liability would have
changed by how much?
tax share effect ≈
(new tax share – old tax share) × (old extension)
The tax extension effect isolates the part of the total
annual change in an individual’s tax liability that
is caused by changes in the tax extension and not
by changes in tax share. It is the answer to the ques-
tion: if my tax share had stayed the same, my tax
liability would have changed by how much?
tax extension effect ≈
(new extension – old extension) ×
(old tax share)
The tax share effect and the tax extension effect ex-
plain changes in the level of tax liability.12 Perhaps
more intuitive is the role of the tax share and tax
extension in explaining percentage changes in tax
liability. The equation below is a useful rule of
thumb for calculating percentage changes in an in-
dividual’s property tax liability.
%∆ Tax Liability ≈%∆ (tax share) + %∆ (extension)  
This rule says that the percentage change in an in-
dividual’s property tax liability is approximately
equal to the percentage in her tax share plus the
percentage change in her taxing district’s extension. 
This has at least four provocative implications.
First, an individual’s tax liability can increase from
one year to the next, even though an individual’s
tax district does not increase its revenue (i.e., exten-
sion). Second, although PTELL may prevent the
C H A P T E R  3
11 Programs such as tax increment finance (TIF) do not interfere with these calculations. Tax relief programs that operate outside of the
assessment system, such as the property tax credit on individual income taxes or abatements financed by taxing districts, are not ac-
counted for by the equation but the equation can easily be modified to do so. 
12 The expressions for calculating the actual (rather than approximate) tax share and tax extension effects are similar to those presented,
but are a bit less intuitive. For small changes in tax shares and extensions, the approximate effects will be almost identical to the actual
effects. On the tax bill we calculate the actual and not the approximate effects. 
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extension from increasing by more than 5 percent,
tax share changes can cause a taxpayer’s liability to
increase by more than 5 percent. Third, tax share
changes, by themselves, cause changes in individ-
uals’ tax liabilities. Fourth, through no fault of the
taxing district, an individual’s property tax liability
can increase even though her property value and
taxable EAV declined. 
To understand why tax liability may increase while
taxable EAV decreases, note that the percentage
change in any individual’s tax share is approxi-
mately equal to the difference between the percent-
age change in the taxable EAV of her property and
the percentage change in total tax base.%∆ (tax share) =%∆ (taxable EAV) – %∆ (total tax base)
Consider an individual whose property depreciated
in value and the local assessor adjusted downward
the estimate of market value, and, as a result, the in-
dividual’s taxable EAV decreased by 5 percent. Sup-
pose, however, that nearly all the properties in the
individual’s school district also decreased in value.
As she should, the local assessor adjusted her esti-
mate of market value for all properties and, as a re-
sult, the total tax base decreased by 10 percent.
According to the equation for percentage changes in
tax share, the individual’s tax share has increased by
about 5 percent even though her taxable EAV de-
clined by 5 percent. Our rule of thumb implies that
even if her school district decreased its extension by
2 percent, her tax liability increased by 3 percent. In
sum, her tax bill increased because her decline in
market value was not as steep as those of her neigh-
bors and thus some of their taxes shift onto her. 
We think that taxpayers will find the answers to
these two questions valuable. In particular, the tax
extension effect offers taxpayers a simple method
of monitoring the extent to which increases in gov-
ernment revenue are responsible for an increase in
their taxes. 
These simple equations allow us to explain the 
effects of important policies in Illinois, including
reassessment, homestead exemptions, and tax
increment financing. The rules
of thumb demonstrate that a
reassessment affects a tax-
payer’s property tax liabilities
only if it increases her tax share
or if her taxing district decides
to increase its extension. For
example, suppose that a re-
assessment causes the taxable
EAV of all property in your
school district to increase by 10
percent. Your tax share will re-
main unchanged. Thus, the only reason your prop-
erty tax liability will increase is if your school
district chooses to increase its extension. Because
school districts set extensions, leaving the rate con-
stant to collect more revenue is a conscious decision
to change the extension rather than a default policy. 
The rules of thumb also demonstrate how home-
stead exemptions affect property tax liabilities. The
homestead exemption in Illinois subtracts $6,000
from a property’s EAV.13 The tax share rule of thumb
shows that the homestead exemption decreases your
tax share only if it produces a larger percentage de-
crease in your taxable EAV than it produces in the
total tax base. In other words, a homestead exemp-
tion reduces not only your taxable EAV but also that
of all other properties that receive it. The reductions
in taxable EAV of other properties increase your tax
share while the reduction in your EAV decreases
your tax share. Within the same school district, prop-
erties with lower pre-exemption taxable EAV benefit
more from the same $6,000 exemption than proper-
ties with higher pre-exemption EAV. Thus, the
homestead exemption shifts taxes from low-valued
homes to high-valued homes and away from homes
onto non-residential properties. 
Tax increment finance districts (TIF) have an effect
similar to homestead exemptions. The full mechan-
ics of TIFs are too detailed to include in this chapter,
but the bottom line for, say, a school district, is that a
TIF within its boundaries reduces the school
“Through no fault of







13 35 ILCS 200 §15-175. 
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district’s total tax base by exempting some portion
of TIF properties’ EAV from taxation by the school
district. For properties within the school district but
outside the TIF boundaries, the TIF causes their tax
shares to increase. Thus, TIF districts increase the
costs of raising property tax revenue for all non-TIF
taxpayers in a school district.14
Property Taxes in Cook County 
To demonstrate the potential impor-
tance of the tax share effect, we exam-
ine the tax liabilities of some actual
(anonymous) taxpayers in Chicago.
Within the city, there are nine major tax-
ing bodies that account for all property
revenues raised outside of tax incre-
ment finance (TIF) districts and special
service areas (SSA). Of these nine districts, two are
home-rule jurisdictions and are not limited by
PTELL’s cap on property tax revenue growth. These
two are the City of Chicago and Cook County.
Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship between tax
extensions, tax shares, and the tax liabilities of indi-
vidual taxpayers. We consider three taxing jurisdic-
tions: Cook County, the City of Chicago and the
Board of Education, which, together, account for a
majority of the tax revenue collected. The first col-
umn shows, for each jurisdiction, the nominal tax ex-
tension (blue), total tax base (red) and tax rate (gold).
These nominal figures are indexed to their 2000 lev-
els. For example, the top graph shows that between
2000 and 2010, the nominal extension for Cook
County decreased by 20 percent, while over the
same 11 years the extensions for the City of Chicago
and the Board of Education increased by about 20
percent and 40 percent. One important observation
is that between 2007 and 2010 the City of Chicago
held its nominal extension virtually constant. This
implies that during this period, any individual tax-
payer’s liability to the City of Chicago changed only
if his or her tax share changed.
The second column shows for 10 randomly selected
actual taxpayers located within Chicago the taxes they
owed to Cook County, the City of Chicago, and the
Board of Education from 2000-2010. Notice that the an-
nual liabilities of these individual taxpayers move
around a lot more than tax extensions. For example,
compare the smooth path of the City of Chicago’s tax
extensions to the sharp increases and de-
creases in individual tax liabilities. Note
also that although the tax extension in-
creased during this period, the majority
of our 10 taxpayers experienced net de-
creases in tax liabilities. If tax shares were
constant over time, the tax liabilities
would mimic the path of the tax exten-
sion. Overall, there is often little connec-
tion between changes in a jurisdiction’s
extension and changes in the tax liabili-
ties of individual payers. This is consistent with our
argument that a large portion of annual changes in in-
dividual property tax liabilities are due to changes in
tax shares rather than changes in tax extensions.
In Figure 2 (page 36) we provide evidence of the im-
portance of the tax share effect. Each row displays
information on a different property’s tax liability to
a specific jurisdiction between 2006 and 2010. The
three properties selected are not atypical. For each
jurisdiction, we display the property with the me-
dian amount of variation in tax liability. In the first
column, we describe each property’s level of tax lia-
bility. The red line shows each property’s actual tax
liability and the blue line shows what each prop-
erty’s tax liability would have been if the jurisdiction
held its extension at its 2006 level. That the blue lines
increase over time demonstrates that even if exten-
sions had remained constant, tax liabilities would
have still increased. This demonstrates the impor-
tance of the tax share effect in explaining property
tax increases and that holding the tax extension con-
stant does little to reduce annual variation in tax
liability.” 
In the second column, we decompose the annual
changes in each property's tax liabilities into the part
attributable to changes in jurisdictions’ extensions
and the part attributed to changes in its tax share. The
blue bar represents the change in tax liability caused
C H A P T E R  3
14 This is the case as long as properties within the TIF experi-
ences increases in their taxable values.
“The variation in
annual tax payments
for this property is
mostly due to
changes in its tax
share .”
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Figure 1






































































































































































































































































































































































Jurisdiction Indexed Tax Rate
Jurisdiction Tax Base
Annual tax payments of a random sample 
of 10 properties in each jurisdiction, 30 
individual properties in all. The colors of 
the lines are arbitrary and do not 
represent anything.
Nominal tax extensions, tax bases and 
property tax rates for three major taxing 
jurisdictions in the City of Chicago
Source: Authors’ tabulations using data provided by the Office of the Cook County Clerk. 
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Figure 2
The Tax Share Effect Explains Most of the Changes in Individual Taxes Payable Over Time
Cook County 
Actual Taxes Payable vs. Taxes
Had Extensions Stayed at 2006 Level 
Decomposing Actual Changes
In a Taxpayer’s Taxes Payable into the 
Tax Share Eect and the Tax Extension Eect  
Cook County
City of Chicago
Chicago Board of Education
City of Chicago
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Source: Authors’ tabulations using data provided by the Office of the Cook County Clerk 
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by the tax share effect and the red bar represents the
change caused by the tax extension effect. The sum
of the two bars equals the total actual change in tax
liability. Consider the middle row, were we show the
annual changes in a property’s tax liability to the city
of Chicago. The bars for 2007 decompose the tax-
payer's change in tax liability from 2006 to 2007. The
blue bar demonstrates that the tax share effect caused
an increase in tax liability of about $250 and the tax
extension effect caused an increase of about $60.
Thus, from 2006 to 2007 actual tax liability increased
by $310. From 2007 to 2008, the tax share effect
caused tax liability to decrease by about $90 while the
tax extension effect caused tax liability to increase by
about $10. Thus, from 2007 to 2008 actual tax liability
decreased by about $80. In all years and in all three
jurisdictions, the tax share effect explains at least half
of the total actual change in tax liability. 
Both columns show that the variation in annual tax
payments for this property is mostly due to changes
in its tax share. In the first column, the blue and red
lines move in tandem, indicating that holding the tax
extension constant does little to reduce annual vari-
ation in tax liability. In the second column, blue bars
that are larger than the red bars indicate that changes
in tax share account for most of the annual changes
in this property’s tax liability.
A Proposal For A New Property Tax Statement 
Figures 3 and 4 (on pages 38 and 39) each show a
different property tax statement for the same prop-
erty. Though all identifying information has been
removed from the statements, they reflect tax lia-
bility for an actual property in the North Chicago
Township. We refer to our reformulation of the
statement as the “new statement” (Figure 3) and
the statement as it was mailed in 2009 as the “old
statement” (Figure 4). 
The main difference between the old and new state-
ments is the way information about changes in tax
liability is conveyed to the taxpayer. The old state-
ment includes information on   jurisdictions’ tax
rates. In the new statement, we drop the tax rates
in favor of information on jurisdictions’ extensions
and tax bases and taxpayers’ tax shares. The old
statement includes none of this information.* Be-
cause the tax rate is the ratio of the extension to the
tax base, excluding tax rates does not substantively
change the content of the bill. But it does allow tax-
payers to better understand the reasons their taxes
change from one year to the next.
We now compare the old and new statements, start-
ing from the top of the new statement and working
our way down. 
Panel 1 of the new statement shows the same infor-
mation shown along the right-hand column of the
old statement. The only difference is that the new
statement reports the exemption in terms of EAV,
rather than in dollars subtracted from the property’s
tax bill. Property tax rates do not appear anywhere
in the new statement, but they can be calculated
from the information on the new statement. Panel 2
reports the property’s tax share. This is neither re-
ported on the old statement nor can a taxpayer cal-
culate it from the information on the old statement.
Panel 3 reports the extensions and tax bases of all
taxing jurisdictions in the City of Chicago, except
TIFs and SSAs. This information is also not re-
ported on the old tax statement, and cannot be cal-
culated from information on the old statement.
Panel 4 reports the tax payments due from this prop-
erty to each taxing jurisdiction. This is the same infor-
mation reported in the center panel of the old tax
statement, but the new statement omits the tax rates.
Panel 5 provides a simple analysis of the change in
this property’s tax liability from, in this illustration,
2008 to 2009. First, it gives the dollar amount of the
change. Then, it reports the tax share effect and the
tax extension effect.
* Cook County Treasurer Maria Pappas revealed a
new property tax statement days before this
chapter went to press. Our understanding is that
although the new statement differs from our pro-
posal, it also increases taxpayers’ ability to mon-
itor their governments. (Chicago Tribune, January
26, 2013)
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Figure 3
“New” Property Tax Statement for an Actual Property in the North Chicago Township
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We believe the new statement is superior to the old
statement in a number of ways. We have already dis-
cussed in detail the decomposition of changes in tax
liability into the portions attributable to changes in
extensions and tax shares. That information is re-
ported in Panel 5 of the new statement. Another ad-
vantage of reporting tax extensions is that it allows
taxpayers to better monitor their local governments.
In 2009, the Cook County assessor reduced his esti-
mate of the value of nearly all properties in the
county. Some properties, however, depreciated faster
than others, leading many taxpayers to experience
coincidentally decreasing assessed values and in-
creasing property taxes. Some believed this was
caused by increases in extensions.15 From the new
statement, however, it is clear that city jurisdictions
increased their extensions by a net $1 million, though
some, including the city itself, decreased their exten-
sion. One advantage of the new bill, then, is to allow
taxpayers to see when their government increases, or
doesn’t increase, its property tax extension. Taxpay-
ers may want to know, for example, that the Chicago
Board of Education actually decreased its extension
from 2008 to 2009, two years before a major dispute
with the Chicago Teachers’ Union over teacher pay.
Thank you to the Cook County Clerk’s Levies, Rates and
Extensions Office for providing data.  
Figure 4
“Old” Property Tax Statement for an Actual Property in the North Chicago Township
15 Jorovsky, Ben. “My property tax bill is defective—I want a
refund!” The Chicago Reader. February 29, 2012.
